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In Battered Women and Feminist Lawmaking,' Elizabeth Schneider
examines the legal treatment of battered women. It is a book rich in history,
ideology, and challenge, which takes as its major goal the exploration of the
relationship between the theory of feminist lawmaking and the practice of
representing battered women. Schneider sees this relationship as a dialectic,
with theory influencing practice and practice influencing theory, in order,
she hopes, to arrive at a kind of synthesis that can better protect against the
dangers of violence between intimates. In describing this dialectic, she
explores feminist theories of rights, equality, and autonomy.
At the heart of Schneider's dialecticism is the now well-worn but still
crucially important feminist understanding that the personal is political. As
I read the book, the following hypothetical dialectical exchange kept
repeating itself in my head. Says the very committed, well-motivated,
earnest, feminist battered women's advocate to the woman who has been
the victim of abuse: "We want you to understand that the reason that he
beat you is because he has gender power. He wants control over you as a
woman because he is a man. It feels personal to you, but it is really about
gender politics." To which the equally earnest battered woman who, as is
often the case, has suffered through years of horrific physical and emotional
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abuse and fear, responds: "And I want you to understand that what you are
talking about is my life. It is my family, my community, my relationship.
Who am I without these things? How are your politics going to help my
life?"
The fact that this exchange seems to keep repeating itself in a variety of
different contexts involving battered women says something rather
pessimistic about the process of Schneider's dialectic. At this point, one
would hope that the feminist political vision had incorporated more of the
voice of battered women and that battered women would be more able to
view their lives as at once personal and political. Schneider critically
explores the tension between the personal and the political. She is at her
best when doing so. Instead of reaching for synthesis, however, she seems
to call for retrenchment back into the purely political. At the end of her
introduction, she announces her conclusion succinctly: "I conclude with the
need to reaffirm the original vision of violence and gender equality that
animated activist and legal work ..."2
After an explication, in Part I of this Review, of Schneider's
comprehensive and sophisticated analysis of the issues surrounding battered
women, I build on Schneider's analysis but draw a different conclusion.
Part II argues that part of the reason that there has been too little synthesis
of the political and personal visions is that legal feminism has resisted
developing an appreciation for the role of personal relationships.
Developing this appreciation requires reevaluating the roles that
relationships, privacy, and men play in many women's lives. This means
first coming to terms with some normative vision that includes an
understanding of relationships. Feminism must recognize that many women
still seem to want relationships more than they demand symmetrical
distributions of economic and social power. Second, feminism must be
more willing to evaluate the positive role that privacy can play in
relationships. Privacy is something that most people appear to want in
relationships. Accordingly, it may be unfair and counterproductive to
expect battered women simply to relinquish their privacy in the name of
politics. Third, coming to terms with the role of relationships in our lives
means coming to terms with the likelihood that women cannot solve the
problem of domestic violence on their own. If what women want is a world
in which personal relationships can be meaningful and interdependent, then
attacking the problem of domestic violence has to be about changing men
as much as it is about empowering women. The psychological work being
done with men in the area of domestic violence is political work even as it
is personal work. Unless the masculine psychology that condones
2. Id. at 9.
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aggression is changed, battered women will be forced to choose between
safety and involvement in personal relationships.
Elizabeth Schneider has done feminism a great service by writing this
book. With diligence and honesty, she details just how complex and
difficult these issues are. Any meaningful proposal to help battered women
must wrestle with the paradoxes that she carefully explains. Any thoughtful
analysis of feminism must understand the tensions between theory and
practice. This Review is an attempt to reconcile some of the dilemmas that
Schneider presents. Although it suggests an alternative course to the one
Schneider prescribes, it wholeheartedly adopts Schneider's belief in the
dialectic. Taking that dialectic seriously means formulating new, not simply
rejecting old, understandings of personal relationships, privacy, and gender.
I. SCHNEIDER'S DIALECTICS
For anyone who has wondered why domestic violence remains such a
prevalent problem, Elizabeth Schneider's book is an excellent place to start.
As one who from the beginning of her legal career has been at the forefront
of both the theoretical discussion3 and practical lawyering4 surrounding
battered women, Schneider is ideally suited to explore what she calls the
"tensions and paradoxes"' in this movement. She does so thoroughly.
The book is broken into four parts, all but the last containing three
chapters each. The first part, "Domestic Violence as a Social and Legal
Problem," starts with a brief introduction and then dives into history.
Relying on the work of Linda Gordon6 and Reva Siegel,7 Schneider shows
not only that domestic violence has always been a part of Western culture, 8
but that attempts to redress the problem legally have always run into the
same sort of obstacles American reformers face today. During the
nineteenth century, the legal understanding of marriage changed from a
3. Schneider has written extensively on the subject. E.g., Elizabeth M. Schneider, Epilogue:
Making Reconceptualization of Violence Against Women Real, 58 ALB. L. REV. 1245 (1995);
Elizabeth M. Schneider, Introduction: The Promise of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 4
J.L. & POL'Y 427 (1996); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Particularity and Generality: Challenges of
Feminist Theory and Practice in Work on Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 520 (1992);
Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 973 (1991) [hereinafter
Schneider, The Violence of Privacy].
4. Schneider has supervised battered women's advocacy clinics, trained judges and lawyers,
participated on commissions, and prepared critical reports. SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 6.
5. Id. at 7.
6. LINDA GORDON, HEROES OF THEIR OWN LIVES: THE POLITICS AND HISTORY OF FAMILY
VIOLENCE (1988).
7. Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE
L.J. 2117 (1996).
8. According to early Roman law, a man could not only beat his wife with impunity, he could
kill her if she dishonored him or put his property rights in jeopardy. SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at
13 (citing R. EMERSON DOBASH & RUSSELL P. DOBASH, VIOLENCE AGAINST WIVES: A CASE
AGAINST THE PATRIARCHY 34-36 (1979)).
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relationship of hierarchy, in which men had a legal right to control their
wives physically, to a relationship of companionship. With that move from
hierarchy to companionship came a veil of privacy that blocked the law's
willingness to accept responsibility for domestic violence. Even when the
law was willing to accept jurisdiction over domestic disputes, the most it
was willing to do was punish the perpetrator. But then, as now, punishing
the perpetrator without providing some sort of economic and social support
for the victim left victims with an untenable choice. As Linda Gordon
observed, "[g]iven a choice, [nineteenth-century domestic violence victims]
might have preferred economic aid to prosecution of wife-beaters." 9
The essentially feminist nature of domestic violence work becomes
obvious in this historical account because domestic violence is visible as a
problem only when feminists have a voice. Thus, it was visible as an issue
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but, with no vibrant
feminist community to articulate its harms, it died out as an issue for most
of the middle part of the twentieth century. It was not until the early 1970s,
with the rise of the second wave of feminism, that activists and newspapers
began to make the issue real again.
Schneider describes the 1970s activism around domestic violence with
admiration.'" Many domestic violence activists got their start in
consciousness-raising groups, and they viewed the problem of battering as
an inherently political problem. Battered women's shelters and
organizations were sites for political organizing, and battered women were
seen as political allies, not clients. Much of this has now changed. As
more state money flowed into battered women's programs and as more
sociologists and psychologists started studying the issue, battered women's
shelters became places that provided services to clients, rather than places
of activism. Battered women became psychologically damaged victims, not
political recruits. The families in which the violence occurred became
particular objects of study, not microcosms of a broader system of gender
power. In short, what started as a political problem in the 1970s has become
once again a personal one.
In the last chapter of Part I, "Dimensions of Feminist Lawmaking,"
Schneider dives into the theoretical dimensions of battering, particularly the
relationship between rights and battered women's advocacy. It is in this
chapter that she introduces the critical importance of State v. Wanrow,2 a
case that Schneider helped litigate. 3 Although Wanrow did not involve
violence between intimates, it was formative in establishing the need to
9. Id. at 18 (quoting GORDON, supra note 6, at 257).
10. Id. at 20-22.
11. Id. at 21-22.
12. 559 P.2d 548 (Wash. 1977).
13. SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 30.
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integrate a distinct women's perspective into feminist lawmaking. Yvonne
Wanrow was a Native American woman who killed a white man. She killed
the man after he entered her babysitter's home, uninvited, while she and her
children were there. Wanrow was on crutches at the time and had reason to
believe that the intruder had already tried to molest one of her children. She
shot him. In articulating Wanrow's claim of self-defense, her advocates
needed to explain why it was necessary to think about the "self' and
"defense" of a temporarily disabled woman of color as not necessarily the
same as the "self' and "defense" associated with men. Feminist theory
provided this explanation. A feminist understanding of Wanrow's "self'
included incorporating her role as mother and caretaker, and a feminist
understanding of her ability to defend herself included appreciating her
physical inability to counter his strength with anything less than lethal
force. She was at once more than one person as traditionally defined
because her "self' included her children, and less able to defend herself as
"defense" had been understood because of the physical advantage that her
attacker had over her. In articulating Wanrow's perspective, Schneider and
the other lawyers who worked on her case helped make the law appreciate
that equal treatment did not necessarily mean identical treatment.
From Wanrow, Schneider moves on to a more abstract discussion of
rights as they fit into the dialectical processes of lawmaking and politics.
She notes the critical role that rights rhetoric can play in shaping public
discourse and connecting individuals to a collective. By claiming a right
that is held by many, an individual becomes part of that many. It is in this
way that rights rhetoric is so important to the battered women's movement.
As Schneider suggests, "[w]omen's rights discourse has linked the specific
experience of women with the universal claim of rights-a potentially
radical and transforming notion." 14 Without the collective identity that
rights foster, Schneider argues, it is unlikely that the law would have started
looking inside the family to find the violence that connects all those women
claiming a right to be free from it.
Nonetheless, claims of right have their limitations, as Schneider
acknowledges. Drawing on the lessons of a small town in Hawaii that has
developed a particularly feminist approach to domestic violence, Schneider
notes that, notwithstanding the power that rights rhetoric engenders, rights
rhetoric often fails to provide meaningful help. Rights help to connect
women with something other than their private relationships, but when that
connection is to nothing more than a legal system with its promise of liberal
autonomy, women may well end up preferring the violence of their private
relationships. 5 There is an emptiness to the law's promise of rights. Rights
14. Id. at 40.
15. Id. at 52.
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give women freedom from violence, but fail to give them anything to which
they can belong. This means that "[tihe rights claim in law is inevitably
limited in practice." 16
Part II of Schneider's book is entitled "Theoretical Dimensions of
Feminist Lawmaking." Each of the three chapters in this part introduces
different theoretical dilemmas for the battered women's movement. The
first is the fundamental problem of definition. What is it that people mean
when they say a woman has been battered? By battery, does one mean only
physical abuse, even though many of the women involved describe
emotional abuse and fear as far more damaging and frightening than any
physical contact? 7 Are women who are able to extract themselves from
violent situations not really battered? What about the problem of
essentialization? The community of battered women is a heterogeneous
one, spanning class, race, and geography. 8 Not surprisingly, the strategies
and reactions of women who are abused vary significantly. Asian and
Latina women often do not report battery for fear of bringing shame on
their families. 9 African-American women often do not report battery
because history has taught them that the police will neither take them
seriously nor afford any reported batterers the rights that they are due.2°
Victims of lesbian battering are often ignored altogether.2 This cultural
variation suggests a problem with trying to encapsulate the experience of
battered women at all. Yet it is politically essential to try to capture the
experience of battered women as a distinct harm because, if battered
women's advocates fail to develop a working definition of the problem,
they cannot demand the resources and mobilization that they need to
combat the violence. Hence a paradox: Battered women's advocates realize
that it is at once impossible and essential to define the problem of battery.
The second theoretical dilemma that Schneider addresses is a common
one for feminists: agency.22 The debate over battered women's agency is
16. Id. Schneider makes this statement in reference to a quotation by Sally Merry, an
anthropologist who has studied the same Hawaiian town. See Sally Engle Merry, Resistance and
the Cultural Power of Law, 29 LAW & SoC'Y REV. 11, 21 (1995).
17. SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 65.
18. Developments in the Law-Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 HARV. L. REV.
1498, 1547 (1993) [hereinafter Developments in the Law].
19. SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 64.
20. Lynora Williams, Violence Against Women, BLACK SCHOLAR, Jan.-Feb. 1981, at 18, 22
(" [B]lack men will be dealt with more severely ... .
21. SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 68-70.
22. Kathryn Abrams has written about this issue most elegantly. See generally Kathryn
Abrams, From Autonomy to Agency: Feminist Perspectives on Self-Direction, 40 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 805 (1999) (exploring how women exercise some agency even within profoundly
oppressive contexts, such as sexual harassment, forced pornography, and domestic violence);
Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory, 95 COLUM.
L. REV. 304 (1995) (analyzing the debate within the feminist community over pornography
regulation).
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probably best exemplified in the debates about the question "Why didn't
she leave?" What does women's continued presence in battering
relationships say about their ability to act as their own agents? If they feel
compelled to stay, does that make them incapable of protecting themselves?
To help explain why many battered women do not leave, feminist
lawmakers began to introduce evidence of Battered Women's Syndrome,
23
a combination of psychological reactions to battery that make women feel
powerless to leave an abusive relationship. Battered Women's Syndrome
helps to explain why some women stay in battering relationships, but it
hardly answers questions about women's agency. The legal criticisms of
Battered Women's Syndrome explain why. Relying on the syndrome re-
essentializes women as helpless in a way that contributes to stereotypes,24
often excludes women of color,25 and can easily backfire when the facts
demonstrate (as they often do) that women actually exercise some agency.26
Schneider concludes, as have many feminists before her,27 that a "portrayal
of women as solely victims or agents is neither accurate nor adequate to
explain the complex realities of women's lives." 28 Thus, a second paradox:
Battered women are neither free agents as the law traditionally construed
that term, nor victims incapable of acting on their own behalf. The reality
lies somewhere in between.2
The final theoretical dilemma that Schneider tackles is the problem of
privacy. She declares that the "rhetoric of privacy.., has been the most
23. Battered Women's Syndrome is a phrase that evolved from one coined by feminist
psychologist Lenore Walker. LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATrERED WOMAN 19 (1979) (using the
phrase "the battered woman syndrome"); LENORE E. WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE: WHY
BATTERED WOMEN KILL AND HOW SOCIETY RESPONDS 35-38 (1989) (using the phrase
"Battered Woman Syndrome").
24. See Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of
Separation, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1, 38-43 (1991).
25. See Shelby A.D. Moore, Battered Woman Syndrome: Selling the Shadow To Support the
Substance, 38 HOw. L.J. 297, 302-03 (1995) (arguing that African-American women must
overcome cultural stereotypes that they arc domineering and masculine before they can even use
the "learned helplessness" theory built into Battered Women's Syndrome).
26. See Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths and Misconceptions in
Current Reform Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 379, 397 (1991) (documenting cases in which
battered women kill their abusers while the abusers are sleeping, through contract killings, or in
other ways that suggest the battered women are exercising agency inconsistent with the idea of
learned helplessness); see also David L. Faigman & Amy J. Wright, The Battered Woman
Syndrome in the Age of Science, 39 ARIZ. L. REv. 67, 112 (1997) (arguing that
"[blecause... 'learned helplessness' theory places so much emphasis upon the woman's inability
to rescue herself from the abusive situation, any proactive measures on the woman's part may
thrust her outside of the protective realm of syndrome theory").
27. See generally Katharine K. Baker, Gender, Genes and Choice: A Feminist Analysis of
Evolutionary Biology and Law & Economics (Feb. 8, 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author); supra note 22 (discussing Kathryn Abrams's work on agency).
28. SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 82.
29. The controversy surrounding Battered Women's Syndrome also highlights Schneider's
first theoretical dilemma, the problem of definition. Battered Women's Syndrome essentializes
"battered" in such a way as to exclude many victims of abuse from the definition of "battered
women."
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important ideological obstacle to legal change and reform." 3 By defining
domestic abuse as a private problem, the law has made it harder to
conceptualize the problem as one for which all people have a social
responsibility. 3' By endorsing the notion that family interactions are
somehow different from other interactions, and that therefore the law
should be less willing to regulate them, the law has tacitly approved the
violence that can permeate family life. Schneider cites DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Department of Social Services" as an important
example of how this legal treatment of family privacy keeps the law from
providing the help that women need. In DeShaney, the Supreme Court held
that the state had no affirmative duty to protect a child, Joshua DeShaney,
who had been repeatedly beaten by his father, even though the state had
been investigating the case for several years.33 Since DeShaney, women
abused by their partners have been treated in much the same way as was
Joshua DeShaney, denied the right to claim that the state has a duty to
protect them from the physical harm inflicted by people within the home.34
Schneider ends this chapter, however, with warnings about simply
making public that which has been thought of as private. She suggests that
the politicization of and publicity surrounding battery has come with a cost,
namely professionalization. With professionalization came increased
accounting and regulation and a diminished ability to approach the issue as
one of gender politics. Battered women's advocates defined the problem of
abuse with enough particularity to bring the issue into public focus, but the
bureaucratization that followed the public focus ironically reprivatized the
issue. The social workers that began providing services and the dispute
resolution processes implemented to help handle domestic disputes once
again defined the issue as one of family and privacy, not one of equal
rights. Hence the third theoretical dilemma presents a third paradox: By
making domestic violence an increasingly public concern, advocates once
again made it a private matter.36
The last two parts of Schneider's book, "Implementing Feminist
Lawmaking" and "Aspirations, Limits and Possibilities," are less
30. SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 87.
31. See id. at 89.
32. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
33. Id. at 192-93, 195.
34. See James T.R. Jones, Battered Spouses' Section 1983 Damage Actions Against the
Unresponsive Police After DeShaney, 93 W. VA. L. REV. 251 (1991).
35. With a perfunctory cite to Anita Allen's work, see SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 89-90,
257-58 n. 11 (citing ANITA L. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE
SOCIETY 70-72 (1988); Anita L. Allen, Coercing Privacy, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 723, 746
(1999)), Schneider acknowledges that protecting some notion of privacy may be important, but,
given the tone of the chapter, it is hard to believe that her heart is in this acknowledgment. The
importance of protecting some notion of privacy is discussed infra Section II.B.
36. This is, essentially, the political-becoming-personal problem that Schneider refers to
earlier. See supra text accompanying notes 1-2.
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theoretical than the first but no less important. It is in the last two parts that
she provides concrete examples of what happens in jury boxes, judges'
chambers, and law offices when battered women appear in court. The first
chapter of "Implementing Feminist Lawmaking" gives an overview of how
many of the problems that battered women encounter are problems
common to other feminist legal struggles. Thus, although women have been
given opportunities to voice their experiences in court, they are often not
heard. Why they are not heard is an important question. Schneider suggests
that people do not hear women because it is simply too threatening to do
so.3" Believing women, whether they are talking about sexual harassment,
rape, or domestic violence, requires acknowledging the reality of violence.
For women, this can feel too frightening; for men, it can feel too
accusatory.
It is not only because women's stories are threatening, however, that
judges and jurors disbelieve them. As Schneider explains, because the
stories that battered women tell often do not conform to our cultural script
for how truth emerges, they often seem false.38 Battered women, like other
victims of abuse, often tell their stories in bits and pieces, and the story
changes as it comes out. This should not necessarily suggest that the
women are lying. Various psychological devices readily account for why a
woman's story would not emerge as one solid, permanent version of the
truth. 39 Expert testimony can help educate the jury about how the truth is
likely to emerge from victims of abuse, but expert testimony creates the
same essentialization problem analyzed previously: An expert can tell the
jury how a typical battered woman might respond in a manner different
from that prescribed by the cultural script, but when the behavior in
question fails to conform to either the cultural script or the alternative,
expert-testimony script, the jury is still left disbelieving the woman.4°In the next two chapters of "Implementing Feminist Lawmaking,"
Schneider tackles the two most prominent legal issues in the battered
women's movement. The first is the problem of battered women who kill
their abusers. The second is the problem of battered women struggling to
retain custody of their children. Quoting Martha Mahoney, Schneider
37. SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 103 ("[]ssues that women are raising... are extremely
threatening and bring conflict into the open.").
38. Id. at 106-08. Schneider relics heavily on the work of Kim Lane Scheppele for this
analysis. See Kim Lane Scheppele, Just the Facts, Ma'am: Sexualized Violence, Evidentiary
Habits, and the Revision of Truth, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 123 (1992); Kim Lane Scheppele, The
Re.Vision of Rape Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1095 (1987).
39. The abuse itself creates patterns of denial and distancing that keeps the woman from
being in touch with what really happened. See sources cited supra note 38.
40. Katharine K. Baker, A Wigmorian Defense of Feminist Method, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 861,
869 (1998) ("Syndrome evidence [often] backfires because it allows the jurors to substitute one
stereotype for another.... [W]hen a victim fails to conform to the syndrome script, the jury
dismisses her as readily as it would dismiss victims who did not conform to the cultural script.").
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acknowledges that "the needs of battered women in custody cases seem
almost directly inverse to self-defense cases." 4' In the cases of women who
kill, advocates must prove that the killing was the result of a kind of a
dysfunctionality (something like "learned helplessness" 42) engendered by
the abuse. In cases of women fighting to retain custody, advocates must
prove functionality.
Schneider argues that the key to helping battered women who have
killed their abusers is to see their actions as reasonable in light of their
circumstances, not psychotic or the result of particularized weakness. 43 This
position makes her particularly wary of Battered Women's Syndrome and
the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in State v. Kelly,4 one of the first
cases to admit expert Battered Women's Syndrome evidence.45 She argues
that the law should treat the battered woman who kills her abuser just as the
law tends to see the man who, in the "heat of passion," kills his wife or her
lover.46 Just as judges tend to understand his circumstances sufficiently to
view him sympathetically, even when they cannot condone his actions, so
advocates too must work to make judges and juries understand a battered
woman's circumstances sufficiently for them to view her sympathetically,
without viewing her as a complete victim. Not only will this strategy better
embody what Schneider calls "[tihe equal rights framework," 47 it will also
allow women to rid themselves of the victimization stigma and the
essentializing problems that have accompanied the use of Battered
Women's Syndrome.
Schneider seems somewhat less clear about how to help battered
women fighting to retain custody of their children. She argues that a
father's abuse of the mother must be relevant in determining whether the
father is entitled to custody, though she does not say whether this principle
should follow because batterers will make bad fathers,48 because batterers
do not deserve custody regardless of what kind of fathers they would
41. Mahoney, supra note 24, at 49, quoted in SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 171.
42. See id.
43. SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 130-42.
44. 478 A.2d 364 (N.J. 1984).
45. SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 127-32.
46. Id at 116-17.
47. Id at 118. At times throughout the book Schneider seems to view this "equal rights
framework" as the essence of feminist theory. She never defines, however, what "equal rights"
means.
48. One study found that seventy to eighty percent of men who beat their wives also beat
their children, Developments in the Law, supra note 18, at 1608 (citing Lee H. Bowker et al., On
the Relationship Between Wife Beating and Child Abuse, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON WIFE
ABUSE 158, 162 (Kersti YI16 & Michele Bograd eds., 1988)), but custody determinations are not
usually made on this kind of statistical evidence. Consider the well-known custody case over O.J.
Simpson's children in which the trial court ruled irrelevant any evidence of domestic abuse or
murder. See Simpson v. Brown, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 389, 392 (Ct. App. 1998). Although the trial
court's decision was overturned on appeal, the appellate court did not hold that evidence of
domestic abuse necessarily defeats a claim for custody. See id.
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make,49 or because to allow them to retain custody presumably involves
some continuing contact with the mother."° She notes with sympathy the
well-publicized case of Hedda Nussbaum, who, some argued, should have
been prosecuted along with Joel Steinberg for the murder of their
daughter."' Steinberg badly beat both Nussbaum and their daughter, but
some feminists thought that Nussbaum should have been held responsible
for failing to remove the child from the abusive environment. Battered
women's advocates, with whom Schneider aligns herself, suggest that
blaming Nussbaum was an archetypal example of blaming the victim.
52
Schneider sees a parallel problem in the case of Susan Smith, who
killed her two- and four-year-old sons because her boyfriend did not want
the burden of children. She suggests that the public failed to appreciate
Smith's dilemma. From early childhood Smith had been taught that
romantic love was the most important part of a woman's life. Caught
between romantic love and motherly love, Smith chose romantic love.
Without endorsing Smith's actions, Schneider suggests that a culture that
celebrates romantic love to the extent that ours does shares responsibility
for women who have difficulty protecting their children from the men
whom those women are taught to love.53
After recounting a litany of cases in which different state courts have
addressed the problems of maternal custody for battered women, Schneider
suggests that we cannot judge battered mothers' behavior fairly "[u]nless
we place problems of motherhood and battering within a framework of
gender socialization and subordination." 4 Schneider does not discuss the
role of the child in such an analysis. In order to protect women's interests
without abandoning the state's interest in children, feminists must frame the
custody question as one in which the child's interests and the mother's-
but not the father's-are aligned. It is not clear how such a strategy would
fit into Schneider's "equal rights framework." 55
49. This argument is rarely made in the custody context, because it suggests that parental
behavior (or parental desert), not an assessment of what is in the child's best interest, should
govern a custody decision.
50. Schneider does not consider this argument at all, but it is a potentially powerful one. If
the only way to honor the father's parental rights is to endanger the life of another human being
and to perpetuate tension between the parents, there is a strong argument that his interest in
maintaining contact with his children is outweighed by society's interest in protecting the mother
and the children. The most important determinant of children's mental health after divorce is the
anxiety level of the custodial parent; if contact with parents increases the stress level of the
custodial parent, it may well have a detrimental impact on children. See FRANK F. FURSTENBERG,
JR. & ANDREW J. CHERLIN, DivtDED FAMILIES 75, 106-07 (1991).
51. SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 153-54.
52. Id. at 157.
53. Id. at 154-56 (citing Barbara Ehrenreich, Susan Smith: Corrupted by Love, TIME, Aug. 7,
1995, at 78).
54. Id. at 178.
55. Id. at 118.
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In the fourth and final part of her book, "Aspirations, Limits and
Possibilities," Schneider is more concrete. In "Engaging with the State,"
she explains how many battered women's advocates have moved from
being suspicious of state involvement to being supportive of it. This shift
helped secure passage of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA),
which provides significant funding for battered women's shelters,
educational programs, and legal services. The move toward engaging with
the state also led to greater support for mandatory arrest and no-drop
policies that help ensure state prosecutions even when the domestic
violence victim is hesitant to go forward.56 In "Lawmaking as Education,"
Schneider looks with some specificity at the facts and personalities
involved in the O.J. Simpson case and elucidates how both Judge Ito's
evidentiary rulings and Marcia Clark's personal resistance to domestic
violence (born of her own experiences with an abusive husband) helped
obscure the battering that so fundamentally explained the facts of the case.
She also discusses how the failure to secure a conviction in the Simpson
case led to new public awareness of the problem of domestic violence and
significant law reform proposals in many states. In "Education as
Lawmaking," Schneider details experiences with her students in a class on
domestic violence. She suggests that the legal classroom is an ideal way of
trying to synthesize the problems she has been articulating by asking
students to incorporate legal doctrine, hands-on experience with battered
women, and their own understandings of how violence affects their lives to
create new goals for the battered women's movement. The optimism that
fills this chapter leaves one with the sense that Schneider remains fully
committed to overcoming the tensions and paradoxes that the book
presents.
Nonetheless, in her conclusion, Schneider emphasizes assimilation
more than synthesis. She wants to eliminate the tensions and paradoxes by
reembracing the original feminist vision that gave birth to the battered
women's movement. Thus, she wants to subordinate the importance of
relationship in women's lives,58 further eradicate what she calls the
"tenacity" of privacy,59 and mobilize battered women into the core of
56. True to her dialectic process, though, Schneider also explains how both VAWA and
mandatory arrest policies have costs. VAWA rhetoric tends to construe domestic violence as a
crime problem, not a problem of gender power, and mandatory arrest policies tend to deny women
their agency and increase the risk of retaliation.
57. SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 9 ("I conclude with the need to reaffirm the original vision
of violence and gender equality that animated activist and legal work.").
58. In her conclusion, Schneider condemns the culture that "raises young girls to 'stand by
their man' and that emphasizes marriage as more important for women than men. She also
suggests that it is cultural conditioning, not the desire of women themselves, that leads some
women to stay in abusive relationships. Id. at 231-32.
59. Id. at 87.
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feminist sisters that they can still become. In the next Part, I suggest an
alternative course.
II. COOPTATION OR UNDERTHEORIZATION
Throughout the book, Schneider emphasizes the need to integrate an
"equal rights framework" into the battered women's movement. Despite
her theoretical bent, she never really defines what she means by this. In
particular, she does not elaborate on what aspects of feminism or "equal
rights" are most important to the battered women's movement. When she
writes about Wanrow,6° it is clear that she believes that incorporating an
equal rights perspective means incorporating how women's subjective
experiences of fear, violence, and autonomy may be different from men's.
In other instances, however, while careful to acknowledge women's
subjective experiences, Schneider discounts the importance of these
experiences, arguing instead that women's subjectivity is too much shaped
by the patriarchal culture around them.6 When she calls for a renewed faith
in the original feminist political vision, she seems to be calling for a
renewed activism to dismantle that patriarchal culture.
The dismantling of patriarchy is a goal with which no feminist can
disagree, but feminists may well disagree about what dismantling patriarchy
actually means and how best to accomplish it. Schneider seems to suggest
that the problems the battered women's movement has encountered are the
result of feminism being coopted, not feminism being undertheorized. This
is somewhat unsatisfying to anyone familiar with feminist theory, because
the question of whether the problem is one of cooptation or
undertheorization may depend, in large part, on what Schneider means by
feminist lawmaking and equal rights.
In this Part, I explore three areas that I suggest have been
undertheorized, or at least too easily dismissed, in much feminist legal
analysis of domestic violence. First, I argue that feminists must recognize
the positive role that relationships play in our lives. Dismissing the positive
aspects of relationships because many women find themselves in
oppressive or violent ones can make feminist analysis appear blind to the
actual needs and desires of many women. Ignoring the inevitability of
relationships also leads courts to find pathology in women who fail to
conform to traditional (and traditionally male) liberal notions of autonomy
and independence. Second, I discuss the problem with dismissing privacy
as a patriarchal construct that ineluctably harms women. Certainly, women
60. See supra text accompanying notes 12-13.
61. See, for instance, Schneider's discussion of Susan Smith, summarized supra text
accompanying note 53.
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have been harmed by the law's refusal to redress violence perpetrated in
"private," but to condemn the idea of privacy because it can shelter harm is
to ignore the important and positive role that privacy can play for women.
A world in which the law had no respect for familial privacy would be a
world in which women had no space to forge their own intimacies and no
protection from state efforts to manipulate women's roles as mothers.
Finally, I suggest that feminism must do more than simply reveal the link
between domestic violence and gender, and it must do more than demand
punishment for domestic violence. It must work to transform the
constructions of gender that excuse male violence. Transforming these
constructions of gender will require working with abusers so that they come
to internalize a personal understanding of how unacceptable domestic
violence is. Thus, transforming gender means making the political personal,
even as feminists make the personal political.
A. Relationship
In her recent article on patriarchy and inequality, Mary Becker suggests
that the two most well-known and accepted feminist theories of equal rights
are (1) formal equality, or liberal feminism, and (2) sex inequality, or
dominance feminism.62 The former is most widely associated with Supreme
Court jurisprudence and early feminist legal scholarship.63 The latter is
most closely associated with Catharine MacKinnon.' If one had to place
Schneider's feminism in either of these camps, it would probably be placed
in dominance feminism.65 The inability of liberal feminism, with its
emphasis on similar treatment and choice, to address the problems of
62. Mary Becker, Patriarchy and Inequality: Towards a Substantive Feminism, 1999 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 21, 32.
63. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976);
Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 1007-08 (1984)
(arguing against sex-based distinctions unless they are based on differences in reproductive
biology); Wendy W. Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special
Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 325, 351-52 (1984-1985) ("I continue to
believe that the course upon which feminist litigators set out at the beginning of the 1970's-the
'equal treatment' approach ... is the one best able to... support a more egalitarian social
structure.").
64. See generally CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 32-45 (1987)
[hereinafter MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED] (describing the myriad ways in which the
notion of difference masks male dominance); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL
HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 106-27 (1979) (using sex inequality to define the dominance
approach); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989)
[hereinafter MACKINNON, FEMINIST THEORY] (advocating an approach that forces the law to look
at whether a given standard or practice subordinates women).
65. Schneider's reluctance to discuss with specificity the feminist theory on which she is
building is a source of some frustration to the reader. Nonetheless, her emphasis on Wanrow, see
supra text accompanying notes 12-13, and her recognition of the problems with concepts of
"sexual symmetry or gender neutrality," SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 67, suggest that she is
suspicious of the liberal feminist emphasis on similar treatment.
1472 [Vol. 110: 1459
Dialectics and Domestic Abuse
private violence is fairly obvious. The problem is not that the law fails to
treat battered women the same as it treats battered men, nor that the law
prevents women from leaving violent situations. The problem is that
women do not severely abuse men66 and women do not want or do not feel
able to leave. Forcing the law to treat women and men similarly and giving
women the choice to leave will not enable the law better to understand or
eliminate domestic violence.
Dominance feminism, with its emphasis on eradicating subordination,
might do more to help the plight of battered women. At a minimum,
dominance feminism highlights how domestic violence perpetuates sex
discrimination because it brings into relief men's power over women. A
dominance feminism analysis suggests that men use violence, just as they
use other forms of power, to perpetuate difference and thereby assert
control over women.67 The horrific stories throughout Schneider's book and
other analyses of domestic violence show how men use violence to
demarcate difference: A man needs to make sure his spouse or partner stays
in her place, does her job, and does not try to be like or equal to him.
Moreover, the strong correlation between battery and rape68 supports
dominance feminism's core tenet that men sexualize hierarchy.69
Thus, dominance feminism may tell us much about what domestic
violence is and how it operates. The problem is that it tells us very little
about what to do about it. MacKinnon's focus is on getting women more
power, equal power.70 It is not at all clear, however, that power is what
women want in this situation. MacKinnon, and quite possibly Schneider,
seem to assume that with more power, women will be able to choose what
they want. As Katharine Bartlett points out, this assumption in and of itself
suggests more of an allegiance to liberal ideology than MacKinnon likes to
66. Women do hit men, see infra note 152 and accompanying text, but only very rarely do
they inflict the kind of pervasive and serious injury that men inflict on women.
67. Psychologists Goldner, Penn, Sheinberg, and Walker argue that men use violence to
reinforce gender. Virginia Goldner et al., Love and Violence: Gender Paradoxes in Volatile
Attachments, 29 FAM. PROCESS 343, 351 (1990). Catharine MacKinnon argues that creating
gender, or difference, was the defining moment for patriarchy:
[On the first day that matters, dominance was achieved, probably by force. By the
second day, division along the same lines had to be relatively firmly in place. On the
third day, if not sooner, differences were demarcated, together with social systems to
exaggerate them in perception and in fact, because the systematically differential
delivery of benefits and deprivations required making no mistake about who was who.
MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 64, at 40.
68. See, e.g., Mahoney, supra note 24, at 86.
69. Catharine A. MacKinnon, A Feminist/Political Approach: Pleasure Under Patriarchy, in
THEORIES OF HUMAN SEXUALITY 65 (James H. Geer & William T. O'Donohue eds., 1987)
("Male dominance is sexual. Meaning: men in particular, if not men alone, sexualize
hierarchy....").
70. "I say, give women equal power in social life. Let what we say matter, then we will
discourse on questions of morality. Take your foot off our necks, then we will hear in what tongue
women speak." MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 64, at 45.
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admit.7 1 If women need power because power enables choice, then power is
important as a means of achieving choice, the liberal ideal. Yet, as
suggested above, the liberal ideal hardly seems like the answer to domestic
violence. The intransigence of the abuse is deeply related to feelings of
interdependence, bonding, and love; ideals of autonomy, choice, and
freedom do not speak very effectively to such issues.
It might be that if women had more social power, men would be too
afraid to beat them for fear of retaliation, a kind of mutual-assured-
destruction theory of domestic violence. After listening to the women who
have lived through years of battery, though, one finds it hard to believe that
what they want is the power to do this back. What they want is for it to
stop.73 They do not want to scare men as much as men scare them. They do
not necessarily want to be in a position where they can just leave. 4 They
want to be in relationships in which they forgive.75 They may even want to
be in relationships that involve some relinquishment of self, autonomy, and
power.76 And what is more, they are not alone. Women who are not in
71. Katharine T. Bartlett, MacKinnon's Feminism: Power on Whose Terms?, 75 CAL. L.
REv. 1559, 1567 (1987) (reviewing MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 64)
("MacKinnon rejects liberal ideology because its assumptions [about choice] do not apply to
women in our society; yet her assumption that achieving parity of power with men will enable
women to freely determine and choose what we want suggests that at some deeper level she
retains allegiance to this ideology.").
72. Schneider quotes extensively from RODDY DOYLE, THE WOMAN WHO WALKED INTO
DOORS (1996). The end of the excerpt reads:
I mopped up my own blood. I lost all my friends, and most of my teeth.... Because I
scorched one of his shirts. Because his egg was too hard. Because the toilet seat was
wet. Because because because. He demolished me. He destroyed me. And I never
stopped loving him. I adored him when he stopped. I was grateful, so grateful, I'd have
done anything for him. I loved him. And he loved me.
SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 11 (quoting DOYLE, supra, at 175).
73. See Williams, supra note 20, at 22 (" [Bllack women know they don't want [the abuser]
in jail-all they want is for the abuse to stop." ).
74. Martha Mahoney observes that the women in her support groups "resisted defining the
entire experience of marriage by the episodes of violence that had marked the relationship's
lowest points. Our understanding of marriage, love, and commitment in our own lives... shaped
our discussion." Mahoney, supra note 24, at 16.
75. One woman explained:
[M]y husband is an alcoholic. Things have been really bad these past few years. But
we've been married thirteen years. And I have three children. For nine of those years,
he was the best husband and father anyone could have asked for. . .. I may have to
leave. But if I do, I'm giving up on a father for the children, and I'm giving up on him.
And I can't just throw away those nine years .... I may have to decide to go. But I'm
not going to do it lightly.
Id. at 21.
76. Robin West suggests that controlled subordination, a relinquishment of autonomy and
power that stems from trust, not fear, may be deeply satisfying to both women and men. Robin
West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal
Theory, 15 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 149, 201 (2000) [hereinafter West, Hedonic Lives] (" [W]hile we
crave liberal autonomy and radical equality.., we also crave-because we also need-the
capacity to trust one another, including those who are stronger than we are. The weak and the
strong are in fact interdependent in this society .... The capacity to safely depend on
another... is pursued as pleasure. When we test the limits of our capacity to trust ... we give
1474
Dialectics and Domestic Abuse
battering relationships and men who do not batter want these kinds of
relationships too. 77 To address the problem of domestic violence, feminism
must address what relationships are and how they operate. It cannot simply
adopt the liberal reification of autonomy and thereby discount the positive
potential of and desire for relationships. Relationships of any kind-
platonic, sexual, or familial-can be emotionally and physically dangerous,
but they may also be inevitable or at least desirable.
Psychoanalytic research from the past several decades has revealed just
how necessary relationships are to a healthy mental life.78 Relationships are
as primary as the self,79 and the fusion of self and other is altogether
healthy.8 ° Individuals seek "contact qua contact, interaction in and for
itself, not contact as a means of gratifying or channeling something else." 8
People seek relationships because it is relationship, not the individual, that
is primary to existence. Hence, the problem may not be, as Schneider
suggests, that women value relationships too much. The problem may be
that many men and the law itself do not value relationships enough.
Robin West suggests that this need and desire for relationships may be
particularly powerful in women.82 The potential for and process of
pregnancy mean that most women must embrace the notion of relationship.
Women who have been or ever want to be pregnant know or at least
contemplate, in a way men may never, a fundamentally nonautonomous
state of being. When pregnant and just after, women are depended upon by
the embryo and infant. In meeting that dependency, women abdicate their
expression to our desire to be able to trust someone who is strong and trustworthy-which may be
a fully human, and not just female, need." (emphasis omitted)). West also suggests that sex itself
can and quite possibly should involve a relinquishment of self-a giving of self that purposefully
rejects a sense of autonomy. Robin L. West, Legitimating the Illegitimate: A Comment on Beyond
Rape, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1442, 1451 (1993) (" Ideally-and it may be an ideal worth holding on
to-the 'self is given with the giving of sex; there is no clear differentiation between the sex
given and the giving and receiving self.").
77. For a survey of men who argue that relationships provide men, as well as women, critical
fora for interdependency, selflessness, and nonautonomous states of being, see LAURENCE D.
HOULGATE, FAMILY AND STATE 39 (1988), in which Houlgate states: "The mere need of others
in my family for my benevolent attention suffices for my obligation to give it." See also MILTON
C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY 113 (1993) (explaining how the
self-interests of family members blend together); Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate
Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 629 (1980) (" Some of the values of intimate association depend
on this sense of shared collectivity, the shared sense that 'we' exist as something beyond 'you'
and 'me."').
78. See STEPHEN A. MITCHELL, RELATIONAL CONCEPTS IN PSYCHOANALYSIS 30 (1988)
("The hallmarks of [a] healthy mental life ... are... attained at least in part through
relationship.").
79. "There is no 'self,' in a psychologically meaningful sense, in isolation, outside a matrix
of relations with others." Id. at 33.
80. These findings are supported by the work of those who find that an exchange-oriented
view of marriage is negatively correlated with marital satisfaction for both men and women. See
ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON 200 (1988).
81. MITCHELL, supra note 78, at 24.
82. West, Hedonic Lives, supra note 76, at 210.
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autonomy. Martha Mahoney writes that "[o]ne of the most pervasive
fictions in the case law is that women with children are individual actors." 83
Men who invest heavily in caretaking, particularly in the caretaking of a
completely helpless infant, may come to experience something like this
lack of autonomy. If they do, they, along with many women, render
themselves nonautonomous. This is so not only because others come to
depend completely on them, but because in meeting the needs of dependent
others, caretakers become dependent. "[C]aretakers... are tied into
intimate relationships with their dependents. The very process of assuming
caretaking responsibilities creates dependency in the caretaker-she needs
some social structure to provide the means to care for others." ' Leaving
aside the question of whether women's quest for relationship is biologically
driven and different from men's because of women's biological difference,
the fact is that many women and arguably all caretakers have very powerful
needs for relationship.
Recognizing this need for relationship is a problem for both liberal and
radical feminism, because both of these strands of feminism, at their cores,
reify notions of female autonomy and choice. As West notes, "[t]he goals
the liberal and radical seek-increased freedom and increased equality,
respectively-are surely intended to benefit.., the well-being of
autonomous creatures. These goals will simply not serve women, if women
are not 'autonomous."' 85 The response of liberal feminists has largely been
to deny that women are different from men with regard to relationship and
autonomy.86 The response of the dominance feminists has been to suggest
that even if women are not autonomous, they should seek to become so and
they will inevitably become so if they gain equal power. As West points
out, though, this dominance view is just as assimilationist as any formal
equality view. 7 It assumes that autonomy is what women want, and it
assumes that because autonomy has always been what men, who have
power, have wanted.
83. Mahoney, supra note 24, at 19.
84. MARTHA FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER
TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 163 (1995). Fineman suggests that the solution to this problem
is public sponsorship of caretaking, which would allow caretakers (usually women) to free
themselves from private dependencies (usually on men). Id. at 231-33. It is not clear, however,
that the financial freedom that Fineman's vision offers women would be sufficient to end
women's tendency to enter into relationships. Women, particularly mothers, and possibly all
caretakers, may want relationships for the emotional, personal and (albeit often limited) parenting
support they give, as well as for the financial support that they provide. Katharine K. Baker,
Taking Care of Our Daughters, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1495, 1519 (1997).
85. West, Hedonic Lives, supra note 76, at 211.
86. Thus, equality feminists have argued, for instance, that equality principles do not require
employers to provide pregnancy-related leave. MARY BECKER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE: TAKING WOMEN SERIOUSLY 64-67 (1994) (discussing the debate
over California Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987)).
87. West, Hedonic Lives, supra note 76, at 211.
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Becker and West both argue that a feminism that valued relationship
more and autonomy and choice less would better serve women's needs.8
The experiences of the battered women's movement provide ample support
for their position. The liberal and radical assumption that autonomy is a
goal that all human beings share is arguably the main assumption that has
led the courts and society as a whole to ask the wrong question of battered
women. If the law valued relationship more, it would never ask, "Why
didn't you leave?" For anyone who values relationship, it is perfectly
obvious why the battered woman didn't leave. She was in a relationship
that she cared about deeply, through which she understood who she was,
with which she helped situate herself in a community, and in which she was
(maybe) raising her children.t 9 She did not leave because leaving is often as
frightening as staying. Women may also not leave because they know that
by leaving they will provoke an aggravated rage in their abusers. However
dangerous it is for a woman to stay, it may be more dangerous for her to
leave." Many of the self-defense cases reveal that abusers tracked down
their partners and proceeded to beat them more severely upon finding
them.9' This is what Martha Mahoney documents in her discussion of
separation assault.92 Not all of the self-defense cases involve past evidence
of separation assault, however, and some involve women who voluntarily
resume relationships with their abusers.93 Women may do this because their
alternatives seem so limited, but that is precisely the point that the law
needs to appreciate. As the experience of the Hawaii town demonstrates,94
battered women may value connection more than they value safety. A
potentially violent relationship may feel better than a life alone. If the law
sees this preference as pathological, it may be because the law fails to
appreciate just how primary relationships are to our lives.
88. BECKER, supra note 86, at 47 ("[C]ommunity, relationships and traditionally feminine
qualities should be valued more and traditionally male qualities [i.e., autonomy, choice and
power] should be valued less."); see West, Hedonic Lives, supra note 76, at 210-12 ("More than
do men, [women] live in an interdependent and hierarchical natural web with others of varying
degrees of strength.... [Fleminists should insist on women's humanity-and thus on [women's]
entitlements-and on the wrongness of the dominant [male] conception of what it is to be a
'human being."').
89. Naomi Cahn points out that the question "Why didn't she leave?" is particularly
damaging to women seeking custody of their children because the fact that a woman did not leave
leads judges to conclude that any claims of abuse she makes are false. Thus, judges see such
women as uncooperative, "bad" parents who should not get custody. Naomi R. Cahn, Civil
Images of Battered Women: The Impact of Domestic Violence on Child Custody Decisions, 44
VAND. L. REv. 1041, 1084-85 (1991).
90. See Mahoney, supra note 24, at 83-92.
91. Id. at 83. As Mahoney points out, requiring that these women be in fear of imminent
attack before justifying their attempts at self-defense, see infra text accompanying notes 99-106,
ignores what the women themselves may know about their ability to extricate themselves from a
violent situation.
92. Mahoney, supra note 24, at 83.
93. Id. at 85-86.
94. See supra text accompanying notes 15-16.
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Seeing relationships as primary to the construction of self would also
lead the law to ask the question that it has never really asked: "Why does
he do this?" If relationship were the ideal, or at a minimum, considered a
valuable state of being, the abnormality would be the person who destroys
the relationship with relentless, life-threatening violence, not the person
who values the relationship enough to withstand remarkable pain and
abuse.95 Schneider acknowledges that the law should focus more on why
men hit and less on why women do not leave,96 but she does not link the
desired shift to acceptance of and support for relationship. Instead,
Schneider seems to accept traditional feminism's reification of autonomy.
She suggests that women who feel so strongly about relationships have
been coopted by a sexist culture that overemphasizes the importance of
relationship for women.97 She is certainly right in pointing out the
disconnect between the emphasis that popular culture places on the
importance of love and relationship and the way in which the law seems to
ignore what relationship might actually mean.98 There is also a disconnect,
however, between what traditional feminist theories seem to assume about
the desirability of autonomy and what women actually experience as
desirable.
Taking relationship seriously could also have a concrete doctrinal
impact for battered women. The self-defense claims of battered women
who kill their abusers are often defeated on imminence grounds.
Traditionally, in order to make a valid claim of self-defense, "the defendant
[had to] reasonably believe his [sic] adversary's unlawful violence to be
almost immediately forthcoming." 99 Although this imminence requirement
is generally thought to be a sound idea for self-defense doctrine," it
presents a serious roadblock for battered women who retaliate with deadly
force when their abuser is not immediately aggressing against them.''
Much of the debate about the self-defense doctrine in the context of
95. Men in counseling for battering often acknowledge that they are there because they want
to maintain or reestablish the relationship. See James Ptacek, Why Do Men Batter Their Wives?, in
FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON WIFE ABUSE, supra note 48, at 133, 141. The batterers themselves
seem to have more respect for relationship than the law does.
96. SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 78.
97. Id. at 231-32.
98. In asking courts to be as sympathetic to battered women who kill abusers as they are to
men who kill adulterous spouses or paramours, Schneider does seem to call for an increased
recognition of relationship. See supra text accompanying notes 43-47. It is because courts
understand the power of relationship that they understand why a man would kill in the "heat of
passion."
99. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAw § 5.7(d), at 495 (3d ed. 2000).
100. Id.
101. Holly Maguigan suggests that many courts misinterpret the facts to presume that an
attack is not ongoing. Maguigan reports that seventy-five percent of battered women who kill do
so when the attack is ongoing or imminent. Maguigan, supra note 26, at 397. Nonetheless, there is
still a sizable number who kill when it is clear that no attack is imminent.
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battered women has focused on whether an objective or subjective standard
should be applied to the woman's belief in the imminence of the attack.
Critics of objectivity suggest that it is rigid and usually rooted in male
norms.'° 2 A purely subjective standard, on the other hand, fails to root the
woman's defense in the context of gender power generally or battered
women in particular; it focuses exclusively on the individual woman
claiming the defense.1"3 Schneider challenges the subjective/objective
dichotomy and suggests that a proper standard should incorporate both an
individualized and a group component."
An alternative course is to ask courts to confront the reality of
relationship. If courts took relationships as a given, again, as a kind of ideal,
then a requirement of any objective or subjective belief in imminence
would be misplaced. Why should the law require immediacy in the context
of an ongoing relationship? In nonrelationship situations, the law requires
imminence because by doing so it ensures that someone who can avoid
using deadly force by extracting himself or herself from the situation will
do so. One cannot simply extract oneself from an ongoing relationship,
however. A relationship in which one could do that would not be a
relationship marked by mutual interdependence, a lack of autonomy, or
love."' The relationship itself, not necessarily the victim's status as a
woman or a battered woman, makes imminence an inappropriate
requirement. 0 6
This approach also suggests that although Wanrow has some relevance
for battered women, its value is limited. It may not be the landmark
domestic violence case that Schneider's treatment of it suggests. The
feminist arguments in Wanrow forced the court to appreciate that women
may need to use deadly force when men do not because, for many women
fighting against much larger men, anything less than deadly force will be no
defense at all. 07 Their only choices are passivity or deadly force. Thus,
Wanrow is helpful to battered women to the extent that courts reject self-
defense claims when the abuser's attack was not significantly more violent
than previous attacks through which the victim lived. But Wanrow does not
102. SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 139.
103. See id.
104. Id. at 139-40.
105. As Schneider's stories make clear, the sad fact is that a relationship marked by mutual
interdependence, lack of autonomy, and love can also be marked by violence.
106. Eliminating imminence in this way is not the same as saying that because women value
relationship more, they should be excused when they do not leave. Anne Coughlin tentatively
suggests that such an argument could follow from Carol Gilligan's work. Anne M. Coughlin,
Excusing Women, 82 CAL. L. REv. 1, 88-89 (1994). Eliminating imminence suggests that the law
should honor relationship more, regardless of whether women and men do so differently.
107. State v. Wanrow, 559 P.2d 548, 558 (Wash. 1977) ("In our society women suffer from a
conspicuous lack of access to training in and the means of developing those skills necessary to
effectively repel a male assailant without resorting to the use of deadly weapons.").
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speak to the imminence problem. Yvette Wanrow was not in a relationship
with the man whom she killed. He had entered another's home uninvited
and approached her. From that trespass and positioning, Wanrow may well
have been able to infer that harm was imminent.10 8 Most battered women
should not even have to make such an inference. Regardless of whether her
spouse's next attack is imminent, the law should not expect her to leave.
There is too much relationship there.
B. Privacy
Incorporating the importance of relationship into feminist theory also
means coming to terms with the role of privacy in our lives. There is a
strong, if not obvious, link between relationship and privacy. Those who
have written about the importance of familial relationships (both romantic
and parental) have argued that because relationships provide an opportunity
to reshape the self, and an opportunity to experience a kind of organic
selflessness,"° relationships need freedom from state interference."0 If the
state defines what relationships are or how they are to be lived, those
relationships cease to be fora for true self-expression and true altruism. If
they are to thrive, relationships must, to a certain extent, be left alone.
There is, of course, a vigorous feminist critique of this line of
argument."' Schneider has been at the forefront of this critique."2
According to this critique, by keeping relationships private, the law shields
from view the inequality and abuse so rampant in many relationships.
108. Id. at 551.
109. Regan and Karst write about creating a new and arguably superior moral identity when
one is intertwined with a spouse or romantic partner. See REGAN, supra note 77, at 89; Karst,
supra note 77, at 635-37. Others talk similarly about the role of self-expression and selflessness in
parental relationships. E.g., Stephen G. Gilles, On Educating Children: A Parentalist Manifesto,
63 U. CHI. L. REV. 937, 1015 (1996) ("Speech and expression are the ordinary means whereby
parents seek to impart values, habits, skills, and knowledge to their children."); Bruce C. Hafen,
Individualism and Autonomy in Family Law: The Waning of Belonging, 1991 BYU L. REV. 1, 39-
41 (describing the benefits of parental sacrifice).
110. See Katharine K. Baker, Property Rules Meet Feminist Needs: Respecting Autonomy by
Valuing Connection, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1523, 1533-34 (1998) ("If... intimacy and identity are
integrally related and if in choosing our intimate relationships we create unique interdependencies
that themselves constitute self-expression, then horizontal relationships must be viewed as souls
with their own emotions, sensations, and beliefs. And they must be entities that have the right to
be let alone by the government."); Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J.
293, 301 (1988) (" [A] tight, comprehensive set of [govemmental] controls would remove from
parents the discretion to act, upon which the capacity of moral decision making actually
depends.").
11. See MACKINNON, FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 64, at 193-94; Frances E. Olsen, The
Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 835, 856-57 (1985); Carole
Pateman, Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Dichotomy, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE IN SOCIAL
LIFE 281,295-97 (S.I. Benn & G.F. Gaus eds., 1983).
112. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, supra note 3 (explaining how the privacy doctrine
hides violence against women).
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Schneider entitles the chapter of the book in which she continues this
critique "The Violence of Privacy." I 3 It is a remarkably effective title
because it focuses our attention on the dangers of privacy, but it is also,
albeit on purpose, inaccurate. It is not privacy that is violent; it is
relationship. Undoubtedly, this is what makes Schneider and others so wary
of relationships, but, if feminists are to accept relationships as part of their
lives, they must acknowledge that they can be violent. They also must
acknowledge that most people, in most relationships, desire some privacy.
Ruth Gavison argues that "that which is intimate, that which may be
related to an individual's self-identity or personhood, and that which is self-
regarding, affecting only the individual (or his close and voluntary
associates)" can and possibly should create "presumptive entitlements to
inaccessibility and noninterference." 14 Gavison is not addressing her
argument specifically to the problem of domestic violence, and indeed
concedes that violence within a relationship should be sufficient reason to
overcome a presumption of privacy," 5 but her broader point is critical for
the battered women's movement. "[M]ost of us feel that there are aspects
of our lives which are 'private' and 'personal,' and thus should not be
accessible to others without our consent; they should not be matters dealt
with by the public .... 6 In other words, most of us affirmatively want
some privacy. Most of us do not affirmatively want violence. That is why
calling privacy violent is problematic. It is problematic in the same way that
suggesting that most heterosexual intercourse is rape "' is problematic.
Many women want heterosexual intercourse. No woman wants to be raped.
Focusing on how privacy can be violent is important just as focusing on
how heterosexual sex can be rape is important, but to dismiss all privacy as
violent and all intercourse as rape is to deny the desires and experiences of
many women.' 18 It is also to avoid the difficult yet essential task of defining
113. SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 87; see also Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, supra
note 3.




117. E.g., ANDREA DWORKIN, INTERCOURSE (1987); MACKINNON, FEMINIST THEORY,
supra note 64, at 174 ("Perhaps the wrong of rape has proved so difficult to define because the
unquestionable starting point has been that rape is defined as distinct from intercourse, while for
women it is difficult to distinguish the two under conditions of male dominance."). For a critique
of these views, see Lynne Henderson, Getting To Know: Honoring Women in Law and in Fact,
2 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 41, 56 (1993), which states, "[A]lthough we owe much to MacKinnon and
Dworkin for their theoretical and practical contributions to the effort to end sexual use and abuse
of women, their story of heterosexuality is a reductionist one of female innocence. . . and male
guilt."
118. Henderson, supra note 117, at 60 ("Many women feel heterosexual desire. They want
to, and do, act upon it and experience great pleasure. Heterosexual desire, touching, connection
with another person who is male can feel good; it can be pleasurable; it can be happy and
enjoyable for women.").
20011 1481
The Yale Law Journal
with more specificity exactly when and what it is that makes a desire for
privacy inappropriate or an acceptance of heterosexual sex oppressive.
There is both rhetorical and real political power in articulating the
extreme. To claim that all privacy is violent and all sex is rape is to demand
a response with proof that some privacy is acceptable, as is some
heterosexual sex. Articulating those responses is as important a feminist
project as articulating the extreme, however. Some writers have tried to do
this. As indicated, Anita Allen and Ruth Gavison have analyzed the
importance of privacy in our lives." 9 In doing so, they implicitly question
Schneider's condemnation of privacy doctrine. Martha Chamallas, Lynne
Henderson, and Lois Pineau have all tried to articulate what positive
heterosexual encounters might look like.2 ° Despite the difficulty in these
tasks and the inevitable imperfections in any definitions that emerge, this
work is essential. A movement that spouts the extreme while many people,
including the elites within that movement, continue to enjoy heterosexual
relationships that involve some degree of privacy, runs the risk of becoming
hypocritical and soon obsolete.
Moreover, privacy may be most important to the least elite. Kimberld
Crenshaw writes that " [t]he home is not simply a man's castle in the
patriarchal sense, but may also function as a safe haven from the indignities
of life in a racist society." "' Families construed as distinct entities, the
relationships within which often function differently than relationships
between commercial actors or strangers, act as crucial sources of cultural
identity. 2 ' For communities of color, and particularly for women within
those communities, families have been critical sources of support and
growth. 2 3 They have served as key bases of resistance precisely because
they are objectively and subjectively distinct from the public sphere. This
could well explain why the original feminist call to tear down all walls of
privacy rang hollow in many communities of color. It asked women in
those communities to forfeit that whikh had given them such strength.
119. See supra notes 35, 114-116 and accompanying text.
120. Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct, 61 S.
CAL. L. REV. 777, 784 (1988); Henderson, supra note 117, at 60-63; Lois Pineau, Date Rape: A
Feminist Analysis, 8 LAW & PHIL. 217, 234-37 (1989).
121. Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and
Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1257 (1991).
122. Peggy Cooper Davis, Contested Images of Family Values: The Role of the State, 107
HARV. L. REV. 1348, 1371 (1994) (speaking of "family liberty" as a means to foster "full
personhood").
123. See BELL HOOKS, FEMINIST THEORY: FROM MARGIN TO CENTER 37 (1984) (stating that
family life allows black women "to experience dignity, self-worth, and a humanization that is not
experienced in the outside world"); Dorothy Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies:
Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1470-71 (1991)
(stating that family life for women of color is a "site of solace and resistance against racial
oppression").
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When activists concerned about battered women say to those women,
"It feels private, but it really is political, you shouldn't think of it as
private," they ask battered women to relinquish that which few others are
willing to relinquish. Most people would rather think of their families and
personal lives as private. Who relishes the idea of bringing a divorce
dispute or a custody dispute or any intrafamily fight into the open? It may
be necessary to do this at times if one needs the state to help resolve those
disputes. It certainly will be necessary for battered women to do this if they
are to get the state's help in stopping their batterers, but the battered
women's movement must be sensitive to how difficult it is for abused
women to let go of an identity and private space that those lucky enough
not to be in abusive relationships can still cherish. This is what makes
Schneider's obvious distrust of social workers and psychologists
unfortunate. Schneider mourns the depoliticization of the battered women's
movement and the accompanying infiltration by social workers and
psychologists. Yet, if we take seriously what battered women have to give
up when they leave the privacy of their relationships, if we recognize that
they are leaving not only what is harmful but also what they have perceived
as their identity, it seems entirely humane and necessary that they be
afforded counseling and support that still feels, to them, private. 1
24
Privacy is important in women's lives for another reason, as well, a
reason central to domestic violence litigation. It is through privacy doctrine
that parents have secured freedom from state interference with child-
rearing. When it comes to issues of battered women retaining custody of
their children, privacy doctrine may well be battered women's best friend.
Most parents have the right to socialize their children "in the way
[they] should go." 25 They have the right to discipline their children, 2 6 to
educate their children,'27 to choose medical treatment 28 and religious
traditions 129 for their children, and to choose where and how their children
124. I do not mean to suggest that all of the social science investigation and analysis of
domestic violence has served women well. Much of it has focused far too much on the victims'
rather than the batterers' pathology. Mahoney, supra note 24, at 27 & nn.101-02. Some of it
continues to see reconciliation as a goal even when there are clear signs that reconciliation would
be much too dangerous. Id. at 48 & n.222. Nonetheless, to suggest that political activism, not
more private forms of counseling, can better meet battered women's needs is inappropriately to
discount the desire for privacy that most people have.
125. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 164 (1944).
126. State v. Fischer, 60 N.W.2d 105 (Iowa 1953); Bowers v. State, 389 A.2d 341 (Md.
1978).
127. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding that a state cannot mandate
public education); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (holding that a state cannot prevent
the teaching of foreign languages).
128. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (holding that a state can assume that parents are
acting in their child's best interest when they seek psychiatric care for their child).
129. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that parents have the right to keep
their children out of public school after age fourteen so as to ensure a proper Amish upbringing).
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live. '3 These rights are essentially privacy rights, negative rights to be free
from state interference.' Although these negative rights are often not
extended to one parent at the expense of another parent,"' they can be if a
court places a premium on stability for the child. This means that one parent
can be granted the presumption that he or she is acting in a child's best
interest.'33 That is precisely what battered women fighting for custody
need."3 Schneider does not comment at all on the relationship between
privacy doctrine and parental rights in custody disputes.
Male batterers can make credible claims to custody because the "best
interests of the child" standard that now governs most custody
proceedings'35 dispenses with privacy doctrine and opens the door to
judicial evaluation of parenting practices.'36 A standard like the primary
caretaker standard, which awards custody based on the parents' past
(private) parenting practices, can protect battered women from this needless
state interference by maintaining the presumption that a caretaking parent
acts in the best interests of her child. 37 The fact that a father has abused a
130. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for
Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879, 884-
85 (1984) (listing fights that parents have with regard to their children's upbringing).
131. Although these rights have not been explicitly labeled privacy rights by the state courts
or the U.S. Supreme Court, the constitutional cases in which the Supreme Court articulated these
parental rights have been invoked in virtually all of the cases that speak directly to privacy. E.g.,
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) ("[T]he Court has recognized... a right of personal
privacy .... [This] right has some extension to activities relating to marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education." (citing Meyer, Pierce, and
Prince (other citations omitted))); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) ("The
foregoing cases [including Meyer and Pierce] suggest that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights
have penumbras .... Various guarantees create zones of privacy.").
132. In other words, for divorced or never-married couples, neither parent may enjoy
negative parental rights. See Baker, supra note 110, at 1545-46.
133. Many states have a presumption that once a custody decision is made, there must be
clear and convincing evidence that a change of custody is in the best interest of the child. See, e.g.,
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/610 (West 1999); Burgess v. Burgess, 913 P.2d 473, 479 (Cal. 1996)
(stating that the presumption is that a change in custody is not in the child's interest, even if the
custodial parent is moving away from the noncustodial parent). The primary caretaker standard,
which awards custody based on who has performed most of the caretaking functions, see infra
note 137, extends this principle to apply at the initial custody determination.
134. Martha Fineman suggests that all single women need this privacy. FINEMAN, supra note
84, at 233.
135. See HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
797-98 (2d ed. 1987) (noting that most states use the best interests of the child standard for
custody determinations).
136. It is not only batterers who use custody challenges as leverage under a best interests of
the child regime. Any man or provider who wants to extract more in negotiation from a woman or
caretaker who is particularly averse to the idea of losing custody can make a very effective threat.
See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of
Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 979 (1979) ("We would predict that under the best interests standard
the mother, because she is risk-averse, will accept less in order to avoid the gamble inherent in
adjudication.").
137. The primary caretaker standard asks courts to determine who has been the primary
caretaker of the child and awards custody to that person, thus eliminating the need for judicial
determinations of good and bad parenting practices. For an excellent explanation of and
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mother and that she therefore needs to extricate herself and her children
from the relationship should not give the state an opportunity to evaluate all
of the parenting practices that it would be prevented from evaluating if the
couple remained married. The assumptions that motivate parental privacy
doctrine-assumptions about parents knowing their children better than any
judge or legislature can, assumptions about parents loving their children
more than any state agency can, assumptions about how part of what the
Constitution protects is the right to "intellectual and moral autonomy"
which includes the right to "choose and propagate values"" 38-are
assumptions that inure to battered women's benefit and assumptions that
the primary caretaker standard protects. Given what experts know about
how violence in the home adversely affects children,'39 there is a strong
argument that fathers who batter have forfeited whatever rights they have to
those assumptions.'" Victims of battery have not forfeited those rights.
Thus, privacy doctrine and state deference to established family
relationships can protect battered women.
That is why DeShaney is a harder case than Schneider, and many
others,'4 ' suggest. The Court in DeShaney held that "a State's failure to
protect an individual against private violence simply does not constitute a
violation of the Due Process Clause." 142 Schneider writes that "[t]he
majority opinion reflects a crabbed view of the world that reasserts a clear
distinction between public and private: family violence is private and
therefore iunune from state scrutiny." i' It is not at all clear, however, that
battered women who are mothers want the distinction between public and
private to disappear. As Anita Allen writes, "[t]he solution to domestic
violence and the DeShaney problem of public neglect of private violence is
not to end families and seclusion, but to make better use of evidence of
chronic violence." " Women are the primary caretakers of most children.
Single women, and especially poor single women, are likely to be the most
subject to interference from court and legislative judgements. That Joshua
justification for the primary caretaker standard, see Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 360-62 (W.
Va. 1981).
138. Peggy Cooper Davis, Contested Images of Family Values: The Role of the State, 107
HARV. L. REV. 1348, 1371 (1994) (emphasis omitted).
139. See supra note 48.
140. Thus, even if the batterer is a primary caretaker, he or she should not be entitled to
custody.
141. For further criticism of DeShaney, see, for example, Steven J. Heyman, The First Duty
of Government: Protection, Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment, 41 DUKE L.J. 507, 508-12
(1991); Aviam Soifer, Moral Ambition, Formalism, and the "Free World" of DeShaney, 57 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1513 (1989); and Robin West, Liberalism and Abortion, 87 GEO. L.J. 2117, 2134-
36(1999).
142. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197 (1989).
143. SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 93.
144. Allen, supra note 35, at 746 (citation omitted).
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DeShaney was in the care of his father is a rarity.1 45 To suggest that the state
should not be mindful of the line between public and private is to invite the
state into the homes of thousands of women with children; it is to invite the
state to bring with it classed and raced notions of proper parenting; and it is
to invite the state to decide that a battered woman should not be able to
retain custody of her children because she does not meet the state's standard
of good parenting.
I do not mean to suggest that DeShaney was rightly decided. The
preexisting involvement of the state may well have created a duty to Joshua
that was violated by the state's subsequent laxity in checking on him. It is
the preexisting involvement, though, and the manifest evidence of ongoing
violence, that should trigger state responsibility and trump a presumption of
privacy. If the state has every right to interfere without preexisting
involvement or evidence of violence, it has every right to evaluate whether
Hedda Nussbaum, 4 ' Sharon Bottoms,"' and the thousands of poor women
of color who struggle to feed and rear their children 48 are actually meeting
the state's standard for proper parenting.
There is no doubt that traditional veils of privacy have prevented many
women from getting the help that they deserve. There is comparably little
doubt that few people relish a world in which the state monitors and
regulates the most intimate details of their romantic and parenting
relationships. Drawing the line between what is presumptively private and
what is appropriately public is difficult political work. As Frank Michelman
writes, "what ought to be... secured [as private], when, how, and in what
circumstances, is the most deeply and constantly political of questions.
What we must be seeking... is preservation of the language of the
personal . . . ." "' In respecting the dialectical process that Schneider rightly
argues governs this area, we must see how the political is personal just as
we see how the personal is political-and we must work for a solution that
values both the personal and the political.
145. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES 1996, at 66 (1996) (reporting that eighty-seven percent of all children who
live with only one parent live with their mother).
146. See supra text accompanying notes 51-52.
147. In a case that received national attention, the Virginia Supreme Court denied Sharon
Bottoms custody of her son, in part because "living daily under conditions stemming from active
lesbianism practiced in the home may impose a burden upon a child by reason of the 'social
condemnation' attached to such an arrangement." Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102, 108 (Va.
1995).
148. Minorities are "vastly overrepresented among those reported for child
maltreatment... [but] not overrepresented among those recognized for child maltreatment,"
Richard J. Gelles, Through a Sociological Lens: Social Structure and Family Violence, in
CURRENT CONTROVERSIES ON FAMILY VIOLENCE 31, 33-34 (Richard J. Gelles & Donileen R.
Loseke eds., 1993) (citations omitted).
149. Frank Michelman, Private Personal But Not Split: Radin Versus Rorty, 63 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1783, 1794 (1990).
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C. Gender
Schneider repeatedly criticizes our culture's denial of the link between
domestic violence and gender, 5° but she also acknowledges that battering is
"part of larger problems of power and control within intimate
relationships." 151 Thus, battering is about gender, but it is not only about
gender, or at least it is not only about being gendered male. Issues of power
and control may be central in any relationship. This could explain why
women hit men and why women hit women.'52 As one study noted, "the
same characteristics we saw making the family violence-prone also serve to
make the family a warm, supportive, and intimate environment." 153 The
closeness that engenders support and intimacy can also engender frustration
and anger.
Where, then, does gender fit into the analysis? Schneider is not very
specific on this point. It seems clear, though, that one of the primary ways
in which gender affects issues of domestic violence is in its ability to
excuse the conduct. Defense attorneys often use gendered caricatures to
portray a battered woman as somehow deserving of the violence she
endured.'54 This strategy can be successful because "many people have
biases about the nagging, provocative wife who deserves to be slapped
around." ' Interviews with abusive men demonstrate a comparable
allegiance to gender roles. Explaining an abusive role-play they have just
witnessed, men in a counseling session describe the reasons for the violence
this way: "He's the boss." "His needs are more important." "She should
take care of the cooking and the cleaning." "She shouldn't argue with him.
She should do what he says." 156 In another study, seventy-eight percent of
the abusive men justified their conduct in light of their wives' failure to
fulfill the obligations of a "good wife." 157 In other words, women are held
responsible for their own abuse if they fail to comply with gender roles.
150. SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 113, 119, 230.
151. Id. at 66 (noting that battering in lesbian and gay male communities and battering of the
elderly expand the understanding of battering).
152. Women hit men as often as, though significantly less severely than, men hit women. See
Murray A. Straus, Physical Assaults by Wives: A Major Social Problem, in CURRENT
CONTROVERSIES ON FAMILY VIOLENCE, supra note 148, at 67, 70. For accounts of lesbian
battering, see KERRY LOBEL, NAMING THE VIOLENCE: SPEAKING OUT ABOUT LESBIAN
BATTERING (1986).
153. Gelles, supra note 148, at 35.
154. Daniel Jay Sonkin & William Fazio, Domestic Violence Expert Testimony in the
Prosecution of Male Batterers, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON TRIAL 218, 224 (Daniel Jay Sonkin
ed., 1987) ("Frequently the defense will portray the victim as being an evil, domineering and
castrating woman.").
155. Id. at 221.
156. PAUL KIVEL, MEN'S WORK: How To STOP THE VIOLENCE THAT TEARS OUR LIVES
APART 200 (1992).
157. Ptacek, supra note 95, at 147.
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There are, again, important parallels to rape here. The most
comprehensive study of general attitudes toward rape found that sixty-six
percent of one sample group believed that women's behavior and
appearance provoke rape.' Another study found that "most respondents,
including victims, saw women's behavior and/or appearance as the second
most frequent cause of rape." "' Published reactions to various kinds of
rape suggest that people are often reluctant to blame men who rape. Jurors
and bystanders excuse men, claiming that they "didn't want to ruin these
boys' lives," 160 that "[t]he guys are human," 1 1 and that what the men did
was not really rape. 62 Because "boys will be boys," their behavior is
accepted. As is the case with domestic violence, so in the case of rape;
women who transgress certain social gender roles deserve what they get,
and the men who give it to them deserve to be excused.
Focusing on gender as an excuse for the conduct, rather than gender as
the cause of the conduct, 163 helps avoid the debate about who beats whom
more and why. 64 It also suggests that the intractability of domestic violence
as a problem may have as much to do with gender norms as with notions of
privacy. Whatever norm or law tells men that battery is wrong is
counteracted by gender norms that reaffirm their right to control and their
partners' duty to obey, just as whatever norm or law tells men that rape is
wrong is counteracted by gender norms that encourage male sexual
aggression and limit the range of permissible female behavior. In order to
attack the problem, therefore, the law needs to do more than just label
158. HUBERT S. FEILD & LEIGH B. BIENEN, JURORS AND RAPE: A STUDY IN PSYCHOLOGY
AND LAW 54 (1980).
159. JOYCE E. WILLIAMS & KAREN A. HOLMES, THE SECOND ASSAULT: RAPE AND PUBLIC
ATTITUDES 118 (1981). These respondents identified the rapist's mental illness as the primary
cause of rape. Id.
160. Joseph P. Fried, St. John's Juror Tells of Doubts in Assault Case, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14,
1991, at B24.
161. Journalist Seymour Hersh reported the reluctance of men involved in the My Lai
massacre to talk about the raping that went on. One squad leader told him, "You can nail just
about everybody on that-at least once. The guys are human, man." SUSAN BROWNMILLER,
AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 105 (1975).
162. One observer of a gang rape trial in Michigan commented, "I don't believe she was
raped ... I believe they ran a train on her." Chris S. O'Sullivan, Acquaintance Gang Rape on
Campus, in ACQUAINTANCE RAPE: THE HIDDEN CRIME 140 (Andrea Parrot & Laurie Bechhofer
eds., 1991). "Trains" involve multiple men taking turns sexually on one woman. For a man's
description of a "train," see NATHAN MCCALL, MAKES ME WANNA HOLLER: A YOUNG BLACK
MAN IN AMERICA 44-47 (1994).
163. Excuse and causation are almost certainly related. As Stevi Jackson has written in the
rape context, "knowledge of acceptable justifications may control conduct." Stevi Jackson, The
Social Context of Rape: Sexual Scripts and Motivation, in RAPE AND SOCIETY: READINGS ON THE
PROBLEM OF SEXUAL ASSAULT 16, 18 (Patricia Searles & Ronald J. Berger eds., 1995). Thus,
eliminating the excuse should help root out at least some of the cause.
164. Compare Straus, supra note 152 (highlighting the beating of husbands by wives), with
Demie Kurz, Physical Assaults by Husbands: A Major Social Problem, in CURRENT
CONTROVERSIES ON FAMILY VIOLENCE, supra note 148, at 88 (arguing for preserving the focus
on women as victims of domestic violence).
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domestic battery and rape wrong: It has to challenge the constructions of
masculinity that excuse them.
Transforming deeply rooted gender constructions like this is not easy; it
is significantly more complex than simply declaring the behavior wrongful
or felonious. Gender norms are "sticky norms" -norms highly resistant to
change.65 Part of the reason they are sticky is that they are so well
internalized. Simply declaring wrongful that which has not been seen as
wrongful and that which, as gendered, may be deeply embedded in notions
of self-identity is not likely to be a very effective means of combating the
norm.1 66 As Dan Kahan has recently argued, if the law punishes an action
more severely than the average decisionmaker would, it is quite likely that
there will be widespread underenforcement of the law. 167 No one wants to
enforce a law that she does not view as just or fair. This problem is
particularly significant in the domestic violence area because it is not only
legal decisionmakers (police officers, judges, prosecutors) who may view
the law as too harsh, it is often the victims themselves. As Eve Buzawa and
Carl Buzawa have suggested, the chief deterrent effect of mandatory arrest
policies may well be their tendency to deter calls to police, not to deter the
conduct in question. 68 Schneider discusses some of the problems with
mandatory arrest policies, but she focuses more on how they are
paternalistic and disempowering to women, 169 not on how they may fail to
change the gender norms that need changing.
Kahan suggests a "gentle nudge" approach to sticky norms. He argues
that less severe laws are much more likely to be enforced and thus much
more likely to have at least some influence. The small amount of influence
they have grows over time as enforcement increases and thereby works to
change the underlying norms. Some of the approaches he suggests in the
domestic violence area include shaming sanctions, publicity campaigns
aimed at attacking the "manliness" of battering behavior, and greater
enforcement of civil and criminal contempt remedies for violation of
165. For an explanation of "sticky norms," see Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard
Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607 (2000).
166. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 453,
457 (1997) ("The real power to gain compliance with society's rules of prescribed conduct lies
not in the threat or reality of official criminal sanction, but in .... [t]he networks of interpersonal
relationships in which people find themselves, [and] the social norms and prohibitions shared
among those relationships.").
167. Kahan, supra note 165, at 608 ("If the law condemns the conduct substantially more
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protective orders."' Other approaches might include providing services for
both victims and offenders and funding more comprehensive rehabilitation
programs.' The point of these programs has to be about more than
punishment; it has to be about transforming that which has been associated
with the masculine into the unmasculine and the unacceptable, both to
society at large and to the individuals involved.
Many feminists may resist such programs because they seem to
minimize the punishment of abusers. It is far from clear that severe
punishments can provide women with what they need, however. That is
part of the problem with Schneider hanging her hopes on the original
feminist visions. However horrendous male battering may be, however
much misogynistic gender norms may explain its prevalence, however
much it may be a political problem, it is also a personal problem. It is a
problem involving relationships and privacy and deeply internalized notions
of gender. Many women victims want their abusers to change more than
they want the relationship to end. They want the abuse to stop, but they do
not want their abuser in jail. They want to feel less economically dependent
on their abusers, but they do not necessarily want to be independent. They
want to change and they want their men to change, but they do not want to
abandon completely their sense of who they are and what their relationship
can be. If taking women seriously is central to feminist method, then
feminist lawmaking must work to transform, not merely punish, male
batterers.
III. CONCLUSION
Women like Elizabeth Schneider, who have devoted much of their legal
careers to helping battered women, have taught us a great deal about the
limitations of theoretical visions. Battered Women and Feminist
Lawmaking explores those limitations. In doing so, it forces feminists to
look anew at their theories and to listen more closely to the voices of the
women they want to protect. As Schneider makes absolutely clear, there are
no easy solutions. Every reform effort must be mindful of normative goals,
practical realities and possible counterreactions. This Review has offered
both theoretical revisions and practical suggestions in three different areas
affecting battered women. The ideas offered urge new legal and social
constructions of relationship, privacy, and gender roles. First, incorporating
a normative commitment to relationships should allow the law to shift its
inquiry from women who do not leave battering relationships to the men
who riddle those relationships with abusive behavior. Legal respect for
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relationships should also lead to a modification, if not elimination, of the
imminence requirement in cases of women who kill their abusers in self
defense. Second, respecting the positive role that privacy can and does play
in familial relationships should facilitate efforts to reach battered women
who resist the call to make their personal traumas public. Without respect
for privacy and an accompanying skepticism about state and other public
interference, the battered women's movement runs the risk of alienating the
women it most needs to help and undermining battered women's legitimate
claims to custody. Finally, this Review endorses innovative, potentially
lenient, probably controversial, but necessarily more widely enforced
responses to battery. These responses must target not only the wrong of
battering behavior but also the internalized gender norms that tend to
excuse the behavior. Transforming such personal understandings of gender
is likely to be slow and arduous work. It is not the kind of work that brings
easily measured political victories. It may be the kind of work that is
essential, however, if we are to work toward a world in which violence no
longer undermines the relationships and privacy that so many women want.
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